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The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility
(Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies)
Manuel Vargas
Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is, roughly, the idea that some aspect of
our responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. In this paper, I argue that
(1) in spite of being an increasingly prevalent thread in discussions of moral responsibility,
revisionism is poorly understood, (2) the limited critical discussion there has been of it does not
reflect the complexities and nuances of revisionist theories, and (3) at least one species of
revisionism— moderate revisionism— has some advantages over conventional compatibilist and
incompatibilist theories. If I am right, one result is that the outcome of prominent debates about
the compatibility (or not) of determinism and our commonsense thinking about moral
responsibility may be less crucial than they seem.
1. Revisionism and its critics
Though it is more frequently hinted at, rather than systematically pursed, the increasing
frequency of revisionist talk about free will and moral responsibility is striking. The best-
recognized place for it is a wing of compatibilism (championed by Dennett) that invokes
considerations about “the varieties of free will worth wanting.”1 Within incompatibilism, though,
there is also a well-established tradition of revisionism: (in)famously, hard determinists usually
argue that significant, even radical revisions in our ordinary concepts and practices are required
because (so they believe) determinism is true.2 Various non-standard views about free will,
including Fischer and Ravizza’s “semi-compatibilism” might also be taken as revisionist in one
or another fashion.3 Revisionism (and what should count as an instance of it) is thus an issue for
a large part of philosophical discourse about responsibility and free will.
2What few systematic discussions there have been of revisionism tend to be strongly
critical, though in some cases this is to be expected.4 For example, hard determinism, like any
skeptical position, is likely to always have vigorous critics. What is notable is that much of the
resistance seems directed at milder forms of revisionism, forms that we might broadly identify as
“deflationist.” Incompatibilists and compatibilists alike have attacked deflationist forms of
revisionism. For instance, it is intended as a criticism when Timothy O’Connor describes Robert
Kane’s form of event causal libertarianism (a version of libertarianism that does not rely on
irreducible agent causation) as “somewhat deflationary.”5 Colin McGinn, a compatibilist of
sorts, has criticized all deflationist forms of revisionism about free will and moral responsibility
as well, and arch-incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen has endorsed McGinn’s criticisms.6 What
makes this resistance remarkable, even puzzling, is why it is happening now. As O’Connor
himself has noted, naturalism carries with it a tendency towards deflationism about the
traditional topics of philosophy.7 In our current climate of casual naturalism, it should therefore
seem surprising if fairly tame revisions are criticized simply for being revisionist. It would be
even more surprising if these forms of revisionism had received no serious, systematic defense.
But, this is precisely what has happened, and it is precisely the problem I aim to address by
providing a revisionist’s guide to the theory of responsibility.
Interestingly, criticism of revisionism has been far more systematic than the pursuit of
revisionism. Even theories with explicitly revisionist elements usually downplay it, adopting it as
a matter of last resort.8 I believe that much of the hesitancy and dissatisfaction with milder forms
of revisionism stems from a lack of understanding on all sides about what this sort of revisionism
entails and how it is different than other forms of revisionism. For instance, reluctance to allow
for revisionism about responsibility can be tied to the worry that any revisionism about
3responsibility would entail consequences similar to those advocated by hard determinists. Also,
one might doubt that there is any standpoint from which to anchor or restrain proposed revisions
should we turn out to be incapable of fully vindicating our commonsense concepts of responsible
agency. In the absence of any attempt to develop a systematically revisionist theory, resistance to
revisionism may simply reflect reasonable resistance to ad hoc or apparently unprincipled
approaches to the theory of moral responsibility. Without a clear view of what revisionism
entails, suspicion about its adoption or pursuit may be justified.
In this paper I aim to undermine the broad and ready skepticism facing revisionist
approaches by articulating a clear picture of what forms revisionism can take and what those
forms entail. Unsurprisingly, not all revisionisms are created equal. One particularly promising
version of revisionism—moderate revisionism— appears to be immune to many of the worries
that seem to fuel hesitancy and resistance to revisionist approaches. By combining the folk
conceptual analysis of incompatibilism with the metaphysical minimalism of compatibilism, it
avoids many of the strongest objections leveled at both incompatibilism and compatibilism while
picking up many of their chief advantages.
In light of the above conclusions, I will argue that there may be good reasons to prefer a
principled revisionist theory to standard non-revisionist approaches. Moreover, revisionism may
free us from at least some of the difficulties that plague contemporary debates about free will and
determinism.
In what follows, my focus is on responsibility and free will, the latter to the extent that it
matters for the former. This is, after all, a revisionist’s guide to responsibility. By that I mean
that I will treat free will as a technical term referring to the freedom condition of moral
responsibility. Theories that distinguish between these concepts (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza’s
4semi-compatibilism) will be understood in terms of the analysis of responsibility. This gives my
discussion a very particular slant, but it is not meant as a substantive claim that restricts concerns
about free will to concerns about moral responsibility. Though many of the details would surely
change, one could rewrite much of this discussion to apply to some notion of free will other than
the freedom condition on moral responsibility.
2. What is revisionism?
I take it that philosophical concern with responsibility is bound up with at least three
interrelated but distinct elements. First, there are the characteristic psychological dispositions or
attitudes associated with responsibility (roughly, what Strawson called the “reactive emotions,”
e.g., resentment and gratitude). Second, there are the practices associated with responsibility
(e.g., sanctioning, rewarding, praising, and blaming). Finally, there is the cluster of beliefs,
judgments, or concepts about responsibility (including beliefs about the conditions for
appropriate ascription of responsibility) that we might broadly call the folk concept of
responsibility.
Though our concerns are spread over the elements just mentioned, I take that there are a
number of particular questions one might attempt to answer with a theory of responsibility. One
question is what we might call metaphysical in the broad sense: “What is the nature of
responsibility?” Other questions include: “What do we think about responsibility?” and “What
should we think about responsibility?” In principle, we might offer different answers to each of
these questions, though presumably they will overlap in various ways.
Revisionism emerges out of a difference between the projects invited by the last two
questions. One project is diagnostic, for it attempts to give a diagnosis of our commonsense
5reflections regarding responsibility. A diagnostic account of responsibility would be concerned
to reflect the facts about our concept of moral responsibility and its conditions of application.
The second project is something we might call prescriptive, for it aims at generating a theory that
can guide our thinking about (and practice of) responsibility. In other words, it tells us what we
should think and do.
A typical theory of responsibility will contain elements of some or all of the above
elements. And, diagnostic and prescriptive projects doubtlessly have important connections to
one another and to the more general question of the nature of responsibility. For many, an ideal
result would be the discovery that we should and in fact do think in some way mirrors what is the
case about responsibility itself. However, we need not suppose that such a felicitous alignment of
ontology, normativity, and actual practices has occurred.
This possibility, the one that allows for a difference in diagnostic and prescriptive
projects, captures the idea of revisionism that is central to this paper. A theory is for our purposes
paradigmatically revisionist if it prescribes something other than what it diagnoses. In contrast
central case of a conventional, non-revisionist theory is one where the diagnostic and prescriptive
aspects of the theory do not bifurcate, treating diagnostic and prescriptive aspects of the theory in
a unified way. Thus, to determine whether a theory is revisionist or not in the paradigmatic
sense, we need only determine whether its diagnosis and prescription are the same or different.
There are other kinds of theories that could be reasonably characterized as revisionist,
though not in our paradigmatic sense. It may help to clarify matters to distinguish them from one
another and from paradigmatic revisionism. One alternative variety of revisionism concerns
departures from accurately characterizing the nature of responsibility— something we might call
de re revisionism. A theory is de re revisionist if it does not accurately reflect the nature of
6responsibility, whatever that may be. For example, if it turns out that our responsibility-
characteristic practices are, as compatibilists maintain, compatible with determinism, then a
theory that holds that they are not (e.g. a libertarian theory) is de re revisionist about that our
responsibility-characteristic practices. Or, if agent causalists are right, event causal libertarians
and compatibilists will count as de re revisionists. Until we find a way to decisively determine
the nature of responsibility, attributions of de re revisionism will be a largely partisan endeavor.
Still, we can say that all theories that aim to correctly characterize the nature of responsibility
and get it wrong will be de re revisionist about what they get wrong. Naturally, few conventional
theories of responsibility are likely to set out to be de re revisionist, for to be described as such
will usually amount to a polite way of saying the theory is false, bad, or otherwise
unsatisfactory.9
Another way in which a theory might count as revisionist is if it prescribes responsibility-
characteristic practices, attitudes, beliefs, or our construals of them, that are different than the
ones we in fact have. This form of revisionism can be called de facto revisionism. Our ability to
determine whether a theory is de facto revisionist turns on the extent to which we have correctly
characterized responsibility practices, attitudes, and beliefs. To the degree to which these are
unsettled or disputed, categorization of de facto revisionist theories will be contentious.
De facto revisionism cuts across paradigmatic revisionism, and thus some instances of de
facto revisionism will also count as instances of paradigmatic revisionism, and vice-versa.
Indeed, the success of most paradigmatic revisionisms will partly hinge on also being de facto
revisionist. A paradigmatic de facto revisionist theory is one in which the prescriptive aspect of
the proposed theory differs from both its diagnostic aspect and the facts about our construals of
our responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes, and beliefs, or those elements themselves.10
7Other forms of paradigmatic revisionism will not count as de facto revisionism, however. For
example, a revisionist theory which misdiagnoses our folk concept of responsibility, and as
consequences prescribes changes that are falsely believed to be departures from how we think
about responsibility would not be de facto revisionist. Its de facto non-revisionism would simply
reflect the fact that it prescriptive element does not depart from how we actually think about
responsibility. 11
In what follows, I focus on paradigmatic revisionism. Consequently, further uses of the
unmodified term ‘revisionist’ should be taken to refer to paradigmatic revisionism. This sort of
revisionism has the benefit of being comparatively easy to identify: any theory that holds that our
thinking is one way but should be another will be an instance of paradigmatic revisionism. Of
course, revisionism may be inadvertent, unnoticed, or unappreciated by its author(s). A theory
could have prescriptive implications that an author has missed or failed to fully draw out— de
dicto non-revisionism, if you like. Moreover, there might be systematic ambiguity in a proposal
that makes some cases impossible to determine whether it is revisionist or not. In spite of the
complexities involved in making these determinations (see §6 for some of them), these
challenges are minor compared to those involved in making determinations about de re  and de
facto revisionism. We would need a true and complete account of the nature of responsibility and
a true and complete account of our responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes, and beliefs to
decisively settle whether any particular theory counts as de re or de facto revisionist. Of course,
for many philosophers de re issues are the central concern for a theory of responsibility. But, as
we will see in sections 6 and 7, de re revisionism is less of a concern than we might suppose.
In the next section, I take up the relationship between paradigmatically revisionist
theories and more conventional approaches to responsibility.
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Theories of Responsibility
3. The metaethics of responsibility
It is customary to mark out the available terrain for theories of responsibility as answers
to the compatibility question, the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with
determinism. For present purposes, it is more useful to begin by thinking in terms of how
conventional categories in the theory of responsibility map on to a framework borrowed from
metaethics.12
Consider the following taxonomy of theories, which I will call R:
As diagram R (fig. 1) indicates, theories of responsibility can be cognitivist or non-cognitivist.
This division captures a distinction between theories that take talk of responsibility to have truth-
conditions (cognitivist theories) and theories that deny this (non-cognitivist theories).
Since it is not customary to discuss theories of free will and responsibility in terms of
cognitivism and non-cognitivism, it is not always obvious when a theory is meant to be non-
cognitivist. For example, though it is tempting to read Double’ as a non-cognitivist, Pereboom
reports that he is not.13 There are some clearer cases of non-cognitivism: P.F. Strawson’s classic
“Freedom and Resentment” is one, and Honderich’s A Theory of Determinism is another.14
9However, given that most theories of responsibility seem to be cognitivist and the main features
of revisionism— typically, prescriptions for change in our ordinary moral thinking and practices,
and what follows— can be reproduced across the cognitivism/non-cognitivism divide, for ease of
exposition I will focus on cognitivist theories. Though some of the details would be different,
much of what I say about cognitivist approaches can be easily reproduced on the non-cognitivist
side.
However you choose to spell out the truth conditions of responsibility, cognitivist
theories are either success theories or error theories.15  The former hold that at least sometimes
ascriptions of responsibility are true whereas the latter holds that ascriptions of responsibility are
never true. There are two main species of success theory, which together capture the bulk of
mainstream theorizing about responsibility. The first strand is libertarianism. These are the
familiar theories that hold that responsibility and determinism are incompatible, but that we at
least sometimes satisfy conditions for responsibility. The second strand of success theories is
compatibilist. These theories hold that responsibility is compatible with determinism, and most
contemporary versions hold that the question of determinism (or naturalism more generally) is
altogether irrelevant to the question of responsibility.16
The best-known examples of error theories are hard determinist theories. These are
accounts that maintain that responsibility is incompatible with determinism, and that since
determinism is true, no one is ever responsible. Hard determinists these days are a rare breed, but
a number of philosopher have taken to defending nearby relatives that we might, following Derk
Pereboom, call “hard incompatibilist” theories of responsibility. These are views that hold that
responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. As most of these
theories are presented, they amount to eliminativist views of at least the concept of responsibility.
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That is, these views hold that talk of responsibility ought to be eliminated from a suitably
rigorous discourse.
4. Revisionism: some varieties
Though perhaps the bulk of compatibilist and incompatibilist theories are not revisionist
in any significant way, there are at least three kinds of paradigmatic revisionism available to
philosophers of moral responsibility. Call these revisionisms ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, and ‘strong’.
A weak revisionist theory revises beliefs about the various elements of concern for a
theory of responsibility. According to weak revisionism, the concept of responsibility and the
associated practices and attitudes do not themselves require revision, but our understanding of
one or more of these does. As weak revisionists see it, we have come to misunderstand our own
concept, practices, or attitudes, as they actually exist. Usually, our misunderstanding is a result of
some confusion introduced by philosophical speculation, or some other correctable defect of
cognition that keeps us from seeing what we really believe, mean, feel, or do. But if we just
understand things properly, all that needs revising is our understanding of things, not the
concept, practices, or attitudes, per se.
A wide range of historical and contemporary compatibilist theories of responsibility will
count as instances of weak revisionism, from early 20th century compatibilists like Moore and
Schlick to contemporary (semi-) compatibilists such as Fischer and Ravizza. Perhaps the best
examples are conditional analysis compatibilists (or “conditionalists”) in the tradition of G.E.
Moore. They maintain that people may ordinarily say, and maybe even believe (usually under the
spell of certain philosophers), that responsibility requires that one can do otherwise, understood
in some “categorical” or incompatibilist sense. But, the conditionalists maintain, these people
11
simply misunderstand the responsibility-relevant notion of ‘can’ or ‘control’ or ‘power’ or what
have you. If we just understand the relevant concept properly, we can see that our concept (or
practices, or attitudes) is not actually incompatible with determinism. Hence, it is not our
concept, practices, or attitudes that is in need of revision. Rather, it is our understanding of them
that needs revision.17
In a similar vein, Fischer and Ravizza argue that our concept of responsibility-relevant
control is devoid of the metaphysics typically insisted on by incompatibilists about
responsibility, though they admit that there are intuitions that initially suggest otherwise. On
their view, what needs revision is not the concept of responsibility itself, but only our mistaken
interpretation that its conditions of application include the presence of a “metaphysically robust”
incompatibilist free will. “Frankfurt-style examples” purportedly illustrate the error of our
perhaps natural inclination to think in incompatibilist terms.18 According to Fischer and Ravizza,
such examples show that even though we ordinarily suppose that responsibility requires
alternative possibilities (which they maintain would be incompatible with determinism), our
thinking about responsibility– contra our typical self-assessment— really is compatible with
there being no alternative possibilities.19 Since their account has separate diagnostic and
prescriptive elements, it is revisionist. And, since the revision it recommends is one in self-
conception (not in the concept itself, its conditions of application, or the associated practices),
their theory is a form of weak revisionism. (Which, of course, is not to suggest that it is weak in
some other sense!)
In contrast to weak revisionism, strong revisionism maintains that our concept, practices,
or attitudes themselves are in need of elimination. Where weak revisionism merely maintains
that we need to modify our understanding of responsibility, strong revisionism argues that we
12
must dispose of some or all of the main elements addressed by a theory of responsibility. Strong
revisionism is a kind of eliminativism of the sort traditionally associated with hard determinists
at least as far back as Spinoza, and more recently, hard incompatibilists such as Pereboom and
Galen Strawson.20 For these “pessimistic” incompatibilists, strong revision is usually taken to be
a necessary implication of skepticism about responsibility. If we are not responsible, so the
argument goes, then some to all of the practices, attitudes, or clusters of beliefs we have about
moral responsibility must go as well.21
One could protest that strong revisionism is not a form of revisionism at all, for the
change it recommends is elimination, not revision. This concern is merely terminological. If you
prefer, you may think of the categories in the following way— various theories maintain that we
need to make changes in our beliefs, practices, or attitudes characteristic of moral responsibility.
Those changes come on a spectrum from minor to major. On one end are minor changes such as
clarifying relatively simple linguistic and conceptual confusions. On the other end are major
changes that may include the elimination of various practices, concepts, and psychological states.
Changes on one end I am calling weak, changes on the other I am calling strong.
Between the poles of weak and strong revisions, there is a wide range of views that we
can call moderate revisionism. When applied to the folk concept of responsibility, moderate
revisionism is the idea that the folk concept of responsibility is inadequate until it has been
modified in some way. Unlike strong revisionism, moderate revisionism's revision does not
involve straightforward elimination of the concept, practices, or attitudes characteristic of
responsibility. Rather, it amounts to a “pruning” of that element. This pruning may itself involve
eliminating some aspect of the considered element but it does not require elimination of the
entire element. For example, moderate revisionism regarding attitudes might counsel eliminating
13
retributivist attitudes from our network of responsibility-characteristic attitudes without
counseling wholescale elimination of all of our responsibility-characteristic attitudes. Or, it
might recommend modifying some of our responsibility practices without abandoning them
altogether. Thus, in some suitably broad sense, we might think of moderate revisionism as a form
of deflationism.22
5. Moderate revisionisms
Moderate revisionism introduces a puzzle: does it correspond with any positions on R
(fig. 1)? Not without some additions. This is because strands of moderate revisionism seem to
map on to both compatibilism and incompatibilism in very distinctive ways. To see how, it helps
to consider carefully what moderate revisionism is committed to, at least in one form.
Consider moderate revisionism about the concept of responsibility. It may turn out that
any adequate revision of the concept entails revisions in practices or associated attitudes, but for
present purposes we can ignore this possibility. What moderate (conceptual) revisionists agree
on is that the concept of responsibility stands in need of some revision. These revisionists might
be thought of as "folk conceptual error theorists," for they agree that there is some error in
ordinary thinking about responsibility.
At this point, issues of semantics come into play. Consider the following, which we can
call the Familiar Argument: “If it turns out that our commonsense thinking about responsibility
(or free will) is deeply flawed, then we are never suitably entitled to hold people responsible.
This result is unacceptable, obviously false, or patently absurd. So, we have to show that
commonsense can be vindicated.” If we accept the Familiar Argument, then what I have been
calling moderate revisionism seems to be a species of incompatibilism. However, we need not
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accept the slide that starts with the failure to vindicate our folk concept and ends with the claim
that we are never responsible. We could hold that our error-ridden concept of responsibility
shows us little, if anything, about responsibility itself. For instance, we might hold a kind of
causal theory of reference where participating in the right causal chain allows us to refer to
responsibility even if most of our beliefs about it are mistaken. Alternately, we could have a
theory (perhaps something like Searle's weighted cluster of beliefs), where our beliefs about
responsibility do fix reference. In this case, we might contend that a folk conceptual error does
entail an error about the property. The point is that identification of a conceptual error (i.e., the
folk conceptual error theory) does not, by itself, commit us to thinking there is no (instantiated
property of) moral responsibility.23
It is worth noting that though few, if any, philosophers have stated the Familiar Argument
so baldly, it does seem to lurk in the background of much of the contemporary literature. Few
philosophers bother to argue for why our ordinary intuitions must be vindicated. Rather, most
start with the issue of whether incompatibilism or compatibilism about moral responsibility
captures our intuitions. Considerations that generally favor conceptual conservatism may provide
some support for this approach, but it also may be part of a broader pattern of conventional
theories failing to distinguish between the various philosophical projects that I mentioned earlier:
diagnostic, prescriptive, and metaphysical. In conventional non-revisionist theories, diagnostic
and prescriptive projects are collapsed: the account of our current responsibility practices is
taken to be both descriptive of our current concept and associated practices and attitudes and
prescriptive for how such characteristic practices should be. The Familiar Argument takes this
one step further by supposing that our thinking about responsibility must accurately reflect the
facts about the world, thus collapsing all three projects— diagnostic, prescriptive, and
15
Cognitivist Theories of Responsibility
Figure 2
Success Theory Error Theory
Libertarianism        Compatibilism Moderate Revisionism Strong Revisionism
(Error-Error)
metaphysical— into a single account. The attraction of this singular approach is obvious: it turns
out that what we already believe both describes the way things are and the way they ought to be.
The point here is that the revisionist need not share this remarkable belief in such a pre-
established harmony.
In sum, the difference between a folk conceptual error theory and more traditional
property error theories show that moderate conceptual revisionism comes in at least two main
types: "folk conceptual error/property error theories" and "folk conceptual error/property success
theories." For short, we can call them 'error-error theories' and 'error-success theories'.
Error-Error Theories
Consider the error-error theory. As the name makes clear, accounts of this type should be
placed on the error theory branch of diagram R (fig. 2).
But, by definition, a moderately revisionist theory is not committed to wholescale
eliminativism of the sort associated with traditional hard determinism. If error-error moderate
revisionism is a genuine alternative to hard determinism, it suggests that philosophers frequently
have been mistaken in supposing that all error theories of responsibility entail eliminativism of
the sort characteristic of hard determinism.
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There is a not uncommon picture of eliminativism (strong revisionism) about
responsibility that holds that if responsibility judgments or ascriptions are systematically false,
then all the characteristic features of responsibility must be abandoned. The assumption is that
eliminativism about the concept entails eliminativism about (many or most of) the associated
practices and attitudes. While it is not clear whether or how many incompatibilists have actually
held this sort of view, it nevertheless plays a significant role in the economy of free will debates.
Compatibilists get considerable leverage out of inviting readers to imagine whether
incompatibilists would really stop holding people responsible if physicists one day issued a
declaration affirming the truth of universal determinism.24 The implausibility of incompatibilists
doing so can be taken as evidence against the plausibility of incompatibilism in general and error
theories in particular. Of course, eliminativists have attempted to explain how this outcome is not
deeply problematic, and how it might even be desirable.25 Whatever the case may be it is clear
that thoroughgoing eliminativists face an uphill battle trying to defuse the all-too-common view
that error-theoretic views about moral responsibility amount to a reductio ad absurdum.
Moderate revisionist error theories provide a less dramatic, perhaps more reasonable
alternative. Sophisticated revisionists need not claim that moderate revisionism or strong
revisionism about the concept of responsibility entails the same about relevant practices and
attitudes. Since we typically have diverse concerns in a theory of responsibility, there is (in
principle) room to be moderately revisionist or deflationary about some aspects, eliminativist
about others, and conservative about the rest. One might thus endorse deflationism about the
concept and some practices while adopting conservatism about attitudes. This would allow the
revisionist to say that the concept of responsibility needs to be changed without forcing the
17
resulting theory to endorse a heavy-handed eliminativism about the involved psychology.
Revisionism can thus vary between categories.
Revisionism can also vary within categories. Consider the various possible targets for
purely conceptual revisionism: epistemic conditions, or the kinds of things a responsible agent
must know; the freedom condition, or the kind of freedom a responsible agent must have; the
ultimacy condition, or some notion that the considered act or state of affairs is ultimately up to
the agent; various considerations about rationality; and presumably, a capacity for consciousness.
In principle, any of these things are open to deflation or elimination, in any combination. So, for
example, the error theory might opt for strong revisionism about ultimacy and moderate
revisionism about the freedom condition.
Given the variety of available revisionisms, any theory that capitalizes on these
complexities will need to be cautious about specifying what is to be revised. This is important
not just for the sake of clarity, but also because revisionists face unique burdens. In particular,
moderate revisionists must not only show that the revision is compatible with the favored
worldview, but that the revision is plausible and normatively warranted.
The plausibility constraint on revisionist theories is easy enough to understand: a revision
that requires something that is not psychologically possible or socially implausible is likely to be
and perhaps ought to be rejected.26 Similarly, revisionisms that rely on highly speculative or
largely implausible accounts of agency will fare worse than revisionism that do not rely on
dubious pictures of agency.
Perhaps the most complicated task facing the error-error revisionist will be to specify the
kind of warrant that guides the proposed revision. That is, the moderate revisionist will need to
say what it is that justifies changes in our beliefs, attitudes, or practices, and how, given those
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changes, the revised thing still merits the name 'responsibility'. A likely initial answer will focus
on the way the revision preserves the bulk of responsibility-characteristic attitudes and practices.
But a deeper problem lurks. Since responsibility is an almost fundamental moral notion, a
revised account of it will need to specify a non-responsibility-dependent position from which to
revise the concept. The details of revisionist metaphysics and semantics will vary by revisionist.
For instance, one revisionist might maintain that the successful re-anchoring of our responsibility
practices and talk is made possible by there being a property such that if we were to talk about it,
and to use it as a foundation for our responsibility-characteristic practices, our characteristic
attitudes, judgments, and practices would be well-founded. Another might focus on arguments to
the effect that the bulk of our practices and attitudes can be intersubjectively justified on multiple
grounds, each independent of some external metaphysical fact of responsibility. In advance of
the development of individual error-error moderately revisionist theories, it is difficult to predict
what the most appealing versions will be. However it goes, though, we can expect that as a moral
concept, whatever revisions are proposed have to be justifiable in the same way as our other
moral commitments, and coherent with them. In time, the revisionist is likely to make the
reconstruction of responsibility look more like a piece of ethics than a piece of metaphysics.
Compare the case of the conditionalist (a weak revisionist). There, the warrant for
revision is straightforward: the actual meaning of responsibility. Weak revision of attitudes and
practices would presumably have similar warrants generated by our actual attitudes and
practices. One way generating the relevant warrant is to get it from a higher epistemic authority.
Such warrant is often given by empirical studies. Thus, certain sociological and psychological
theories of responsibility might count as weakly revisionist in a less contentious way than
philosophical disputes about, e.g., the meaning of 'can'. To the extent that such empirical
19
accounts alter our everyday understanding of, say the practices or attitudes characteristic of
responsibility, such theories will count as weakly revisionist theories of responsibility. Of course,
these accounts are not immune to many of the normative issues raised by more vigorously
revisionist approaches. Even if we accept one or another account of actual usage, we can still
raise questions about whether we want to preserve our current usage.
Still, for incompatibilists who believe that a great deal of restraint ought to be exercised
when making changes to our moral practices in light of metaphysics, a viable form of moderate
revisionism will be seen as something of an advance. Where traditional hard determinists
conclude that responsibility and the things characteristic of it must be abandoned, moderate
revisionists contend that with some revision, our practices and attitudes can continue, indeed, in
better epistemic and normative shape than before. This point holds even for incompatibilists who
are libertarians. If libertarianism is empirically falsified— something most libertarians concede is
a possibility— moderate revisionism provides a plausible, normatively adequate account that
accommodates the intuitions that motivate incompatibilism.
There are obviously a variety of error-error revisionisms available, and their burdens will
differ depending on just what is being revised and why. The lesson for us, though, is that we
need not perpetuate the mistake of assuming that any error theory about responsibility entails
wholesale eliminativism about the main elements of a theory of responsibility.
Error-Success Theories
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Cognitivist Theories of Responsibility
Figure 3
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Let us now consider the other moderately revisionist possibility, the error-success theory
(see fig. 3).
In principle, error-success revisionists could be either sort of success theory— libertarian
or compatibilist. Though it is a conceptual possibility, libertarian moderate revisionism will
strike many as wrong-headed. First, one would have to develop an account of the error that did
not make some libertarian element its source. Second, acceptance of a folk conceptual error
theory, even when coupled with a success theory about the property of responsibility, would
undermine a key motivation for libertarianism. If one thought the folk concept was both
libertarian and error ridden, why not opt for a revision that does not require a defense of
libertarianism and all the difficulties that entails? Why hold on to the libertarianism at all? Error-
success libertarians (to the extent to which there are or will be any) will reply that since our
concern is with responsibility and the kind of agency it requires, if responsibility requires
libertarianism we should be revisionist libertarians.27
The path to error-success libertarian revisionism is not so easy, though. Most existing
arguments for incompatibilism rely on the intuitive plausibility of principles whose main
recommendation seems to be that it best captures ordinary thinking. But, as we saw earlier, we
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cannot just blindly suppose our ordinary concept accurately reflects the facts about
responsibility. Some further argument is needed to show that standard incompatibilist principles
reflect facts about the world beyond the considered intuitions of highly educated people in the
English-speaking world. Supposing that some such account were offered, the libertarian would
then face a question of significance: why care about responsibility if it is not like we imagined?
The most likely answer will point to the normative significance of responsibility— that is, we
ought to care about responsibility because its demands are somehow binding or otherwise
relevant to us. But, unless we can clearly show that the normative bindingness of responsibility
practices (and not just our folk concept) required libertarian agency, there is considerable
pressure to adopt an alternative revisionism that (1) tracks the normative features we are
concerned to capture and (2) does not require the demanding metaphysics of libertarianism. Such
is the project of the other main form of moderate revisionism.
The other success theory incarnation of moderate revisionism is compatibilist, though
compatibilist in a way distinct from weak revisionist and non-revisionist compatibilism. The
considered compatibilism maintains that our folk concept of responsibility really is implausible
or error-ridden (which the weak revisionist and non-revisionist cannot admit), but that despite
these acknowledged errors, there is some property of responsibility to which we can refer.
Given these two possibilities, we can finish our revision of R to better reflect the most
viable strands of revisionist theorizing. Consider R* (fig. 4):
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ES: Error-success (Conceptual error, property success)
EE: Error-error (Conceptual error, property error)
  My discussion and R* are concerned with the main strands of revisionism, though there
are other, less appealing, possibilities (e.g., weak revisionist libertarianism and non-revisionist
error-error theories). I take it, though, that I have provided the conceptual apparatus to map those
views as well, though I will not do so here.28
6. The contours of moderate revisionism
Though few have done so, there are good reasons to specify when a theory is moderately
revisionist or not. The main reason concerns the distinct burdens and benefits of moderately
revisionist theories. Moderate revisionist theories start with the advantage of not having to deny
the plausibility of arguments for incompatibilism when they are construed as arguments about
our folk concept of responsibility. In the case of the compatibilist moderate revisionist, this
means that standard objections about compatibilism's failure to capture the full, intuitive notion
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of responsible agency have less force. Our failure to recognize the moderately revisionist
elements in a theory — which is just as often a failure of self-recognition — potentially means
that significant amounts of intellectual resources have been squandered responding to objections
that do not apply to a moderately revisionist theory. Once we are clear about the revisionism, we
can have a theory that can accept what is most persuasive about incompatibilism without giving
up the more naturalistically plausible metaphysics of compatibilism.
The burdens of moderate revisionism ought not go unnoticed as well. Since the error-
success theorist thinks that there is a folk conceptual error and that it does not infect reference,
the error-success theorist needs to say both what the conceptual error is, why it does not infect
reference, what the property of responsibility amounts to, and how we can know anything about
it, given a systematic error in our thinking about it. To date, few accounts that might be read as
moderately revisionist have taken any steps to answer these questions.
Who, then, is a moderate revisionist? The possibility of inadvertent or unacknowledged
revisionism makes identification of moderate revisionist theories a tricky business.29 For
example, as the O'Connor quote at the start of the paper suggests, some might be inclined to read
event-causal libertarian views such as Kane’s or Ekstrom’s as a kind of moderate revisionist
libertarianism.30 At least Kane rejects this interpretation of his view and Ekstrom seems likely to
do so as well. And, given what we have seen of the burdens and difficulties facing specifically
libertarian moderate revisionist theories, it does not seem an especially fruitful route for them to
pursue. Thus, if they are paradigmatic revisionists— which I doubt— they are most likely
revisionists of an inadvertent or non-paradigmatic sort.31 In any event, it remains an open
question whether or not there are any genuine cases of libertarian moderate revisionism.
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As suggested in the previous section, compatibilist moderate revisionism seems more
promising. And, a group of compatibilists influenced by P.F. Strawson might, with some charity,
be read as at least proto-moderate revisionists. Philosophers who focus on  “the varieties of free
will worth wanting” or argue for limited revisions of retributivist elements in responsibility
practices— e.g., Dennett, Wallace, Scanlon, and so on— might all be interpreted as moderately
revisionist in different ways.32 That is, we might understand these theories as attempting to
revise our ordinary concept of responsibility in such a way that it better reflects an accurate
understanding of the property of responsibility. Still, the amount of charity involved in
interpreting these accounts as moderate revisionist theories, whether inadvertent or not, suggests
that such an interpretation would be as much recasting as interpretation.
J.J.C. Smart’s under-appreciated revisionist account in “Free Will, Praise, and Blame” is
an interesting candidate because aspects of his view demand considerable revision away from
ordinary practices.33 Smart is explicitly revisionist about free will, praise, and blame. He calls for
the replacement of blame with something he calls “dispraise,” because he holds that blame
presupposes implausible libertarian metaphysics. Dispraise, however, only involves a form of
“grading” or evaluation that does not presuppose an implausible picture of agency. Notably, he
treats the status of praise and blame as distinct from the status of responsibility, for he believes
that responsibility amounts to susceptibility to moral influence, and that such susceptibility is not
affected by troubles with libertarian metaphysics. Whether his proposed elimination of blame
practices can be described as strong revisionism about the practices characteristic of
responsibility, and whether that entails moderate or strong revisionism about the concept of
responsibility, depends on several issues: (1) the presumed semantic theory for responsibility, (2)
the degree to which responsibility has a genuine place in utilitarianism, and (3) whether praise
25
and blame can be separated from a theory of moral responsibility.34 These raise a number of
thorny issues I will not pursue here, but this suggests that borderline cases such as Smart’s will
require considerable unpacking to classify with precision.
The complexity of unpacking Smart’s case is instructive, and suggests that explicitly
revisionist proposal will need to specify the sense(s) in which prescriptive proposals are intended
to be revisions. Consider other revisionist theories, including those recently proposed by
Pereboom, Honderich, and Smilansky.35 They hold that there is a very important sense in which
we are not responsible, and that if we were to be entirely accurate about things (though
Smilansky does not think we ought to be), we would expunge from our language and practices
those elements that presume that notion of responsibility. To that extent, they will count as
strong revisionists.36 However, they each also argue that the integrity of a large subset of our
responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes remain unaffected by determinism.
Depending on what we think about those unaffected practices and attitudes, we might go on to
hold (as they do not) that we are indeed fully responsible, but that responsibility turns out to be a
bit different than we might have imagined. Thus, though Pereboom, Smilansky, and Honderich
do not think of themselves as committed to an error-success theory of this sort (because they
insist that we are not responsible in some deep sense— and, at least in the case of Honderich his
non-cognitivism precludes this possibility), there is no obvious reason why a moderate
revisionist could not accept much of what they say and simply insist that what this shows is that
the property of responsibility is merely different than they supposed. In sum, though there are
some accounts that may be inadvertently moderate revisionist, proto-revisionist, or well-suited to
recasting as moderate revisionist, the landscape of possibilities has hardly been capitalized upon.
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Still, reflecting on the landscape can generate useful insights for existing projects. For
example, moderate and strong revisionists could agree that a sizable subset of our responsibility-
characteristic practices is in good standing. If so, this points to considerable room for shared
projects between two classes of theory that ordinary categories treat as polar opposites: (error-
success) compatibilism and (error-error) hard incompatibilism.37 By revisionist lights, the best
versions of compatibilism and hard incompatibilism can be understood to have a shared project
of settling whether the subset of determinism-immune practices is enough for responsibility,
whether those practices and attitudes should be changed in some way, and what other changes
follow as a result of abandoning parts of the framework of ordinary thinking about responsibility.
The traditional compatibilism/ incompatibilism framework makes this insight difficult to see, but
a revisionist framework helps reveal it.
Reflecting on the way traditional categories obscure widely shared projects in the theory
of moral responsibility can help us to acknowledge an important point— we have paid entirely
too much attention to the labels of traditional philosophical categories. At the end of the day,
what we need to know from a theory of responsibility is how we are to treat one another in the
relevant contexts. Once we clarify what practices, attitudes, and beliefs are normatively sound
irrespective of our folk beliefs, whether we call such a theory compatibilist or incompatibilist
may be a matter of semantics in the colloquial sense— a distinction without much difference.
You might never learn this, though, unless you thought about traditional categories in light of
revisionist possibilities. What this shows is that we should think about responsibility in
revisionist-friendly terms so as to speed along the dismantling of our entrenched, but ultimately
disadvantageous current philosophical categories.  Much of the urgency concerning debates
about the compatibility of determinism and our commonsense concept of moral responsibility
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might dissolve if we recognize how widely shared the project is of justifying, refining, and
revising our responsibility characteristic practices, attitudes, and concepts. Of course, there will
be disagreements on what and how much revision is required, and some of this will still turn on
issues of compatibility. However, once we see that there is be no prima facie problem with being
a suitably sophisticated deflationist, there is less incentive to worry whether proposed theories
fully capture ordinary thinking, and thus, whether ordinary thinking is really committed to
traditional forms of incompatibilism or not.
7. Making it explicit
We have seen that there are several things that might recognizably count as revisionism.
The central case, paradigmatic revisionism, is a theory that prescribes revision, relative to a
diagnostic account of commonsense thinking, in our responsibility-characteristic practices,
attitudes, beliefs, or our conception of these things. Since the taxonomy of paradigmatic
revisionism I have offered is neutral with respect to the issue of de re revisionism and the
semantics of responsibility, it offers a way to classify virtually all theories as paradigmatically
revisionist or not, without presupposing that one account of responsibility has correctly
characterized the nature of responsibility or our concept of it. Since inadvertent revisionism is a
possibility, and since philosophers thus far have been largely inattentive or insensitive to the
implications of revisionism, we have seen how classifying existing accounts as revisionist or not
raises some interpretive challenges. This should be a lesson for both critics and proponents of
revisionism: objections to revisionism will need to be more fine-grained than they have been thus
far and theories undertaken in a revisionist spirit will need to me much clearer about their
revisionism than they have been.
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Revisionism, especially of the moderate sort, has some attractions, not the least of which
is that it has a way of balancing some traditional incompatibilist and traditional compatibilist
concerns, the former in its diagnostic account and the latter in its prescriptive account. Perhaps a
more important upshot of thinking in broadly revisionist terms, however, is that it both brings to
our attention a largely neglected space of theoretical possibilities while at the same time
explaining what unifies seemingly diverse projects such as compatibilism and hard
incompatibilism.
Revisionism is not without its own challenges, however. For example, one might expect
that critics of revisionism will argue that explicitly moderate revisionist theories are ersatz
theories of responsibility, or that they are in some other way inadequate theories. Though more
precise responses will have to await more precise criticisms, a moderate revisionist response is
already latent in the remarks I have made. Even if turns out that, a given moderate revisionist
theory is not a theory of responsibility, strictly speaking, but a theory of responsibility*, it will
nonetheless have a right to our attention because it will (1) capture much of what we were
concerned with when we set about constructing a theory of responsibility and (2) it will be a
theory with justified normative force. And, if this is true, we might then wonder why we should
care about responsibility as opposed to responsibility*, unless the theory of responsibility also
satisfied the plausibility and normative adequacy conditions. And, if it did, that too would be an
interesting result worth more reflection for we have overlapping justified normative systems that
entail conflicting answers to particular cases. Thus, the revisionist will argue that we have good
reason to forge ahead, even if we are skeptical, uncertain, or agnostic about the semantical and
metaphysical issues that would decide whether the theory is, strictly speaking, a theory of
responsibility. In sum, independent of how the substantive metaphysical and semantical issues
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sort out— including debates about the compatibility of determinism with our commonsense
concepts or the thing they refer to— there is reason to desire a theory of the sort that moderate
revisionism endeavors to offer: one that can guide our responsibility-characteristic practices,
attitudes, and beliefs without presupposing an implausible picture of agency, psychology, or
society.
If the account I have offered is correct, revisionism in several forms is already a
pervasive part of our theorizing about responsibility. If we are to take full advantage of the
moderate form of paradigmatic revisionism, however, we cannot leave it implicit, accept it as a
last resort, or inconsistently endorse it. This is true for both sides of the conventional
compatibility debate. The accidental revisionism of some compatibilists needs to give way to a
more thorough reflection on the significance of revisionism for compatibilism. Though
doubtlessly some features would be changed, most forms of compatibilism are likely to find new
resources when donning revisionist garb. For their part, incompatibilists have much to gain by
developing more sophisticated pictures of what options are available to us besides libertarianism
and complete eliminativism. In particular, error-error theories are likely to find new plausibility
if they are supplemented with a combination of conservatism and moderate and strong revisions.
While revisionists will differ about whether we really are responsible, they are united in
focusing on the question of how it is that we ought to go about revising our collection of beliefs,
attitudes, and practices characteristic of responsibility. Recall the morning of the fabled
declaration of universal determinism. On this morning, moderate revisionist of many stripes will
smile, perhaps stretch, and begin propagating a theory of responsibility that respects the
psychology we have, the world we live in, and the norms that make our attitudes and practices
justifiable. What more should we expect from a theory of responsibility?38
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